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Abstract
Self-prioritization is a robust phenomenon whereby judgments concerning self-representational stimuli are faster than judgments
toward other stimuli. The present paper examines if and how self-prioritization causes more vivid short-term memories for self-
related objects by giving geometric shapes arbitrary identities (self, mother, stranger). In Experiment 1 participants were pre-
sented with an array of the three shapes and required to retain the location and color of each in memory. Participants were then
probed regarding the identity of one of the shapes and subsequently asked to indicate the color of the probed shape or an
unprobed shape on a color wheel. Results indicated no benefit for self-stimuli in either response time for the identification probe
or for color fidelity in memory. Yet, a cuing benefit was observed such that the cued stimulus in the identity probe did have higher
fidelity within memory. Experiments 2 and 3 reduced the cognitive load by only requiring that participants process the identity
and color of one shape at a time. For Experiment 2, the identity probe was memory-based, whereas the stimulus was presented
alongside the identity probe for Experiment 3. Results demonstrated a robust self-prioritization effect: self-related shapes were
classified faster than non-self-shapes, but this self-advantage did not lead to an increase in the fidelity of memory for self-related
shapes’ colors. Overall, these results suggest that self-prioritization effects may be restricted to an improvement in the ability to
recognize that the self-representational stimulus is present without devoting more perceptual and short-termmemory resources to
such stimuli.
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Introduction
There has been a recent boom in research regarding self-
representational stimuli, with a particular emphasis on atten-
tion (see Humphreys & Sui, 2015). The present research cen-
ters on processing benefits associated with stimuli that have
been arbitrarily assigned to the self, and examines if and how
such processing benefits potentially propagate working
memory. More specifically, does self-prioritization stop at
the rapid identification of self-related objects or does it also
produce cognitive effects that result in increased uptake and
storage of information related to the self?
Much of the early research demonstrating enhancements
to the cognitive processing of self-related stimuli centered on
one’s own name (e.g., Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999;
Moray, 1959; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997; Wood &
Cowan, 1995), own face (e.g., Brédart, Delchambre, &
Laureys, 2006; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006) or virtual items
designated as self-owned (e.g., Cunningham, Turk,
MacDonald, & Macrae, 2008). These studies have generally
pointed to self-predilections in attention or memory as well
as judgment and decision making (e.g., Beggan, 1992;
Constable, Welsh, Huffman, & Pratt, 2019). There is also
evidence that self-predilections in the cognitive system may
operate on perceptual- (faces: Ma & Han, 2010; Sui & Han,
2007; self-referential stimuli: Truong, Roberts, & Todd,
2017) and action-related processes (Constable, Kritikos, &
Bayliss, 2011; Constable, Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014;
Constable et al., 2016).
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An elegant experimental procedure used by Sui, He, and
Humphreys (2012) pares down ecologically-based self-stim-
uli to create an arbitrary self-association. Work that uses this
procedure provides support for the notion of automaticity in
self-based processing (Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014)
without the typical confounds that are present in ecological
forms of self-relevance (e.g., familiarity). Participants are told,
for example, that they are represented by a circle, their friend
(or mother) is represented by a square, and a stranger is rep-
resented by a triangle. This rapid induction results in a strong
self-association (Wang, Humphreys, & Sui, 2016) with robust
processing advantages when participants are asked to judge
whether a shape and a label pairing match or not. Such self-
association tasks have been extended from shape-based stim-
uli to avatars (Woźniak, Kourtis, & Knoblich, 2018), color-
coded avatars (Sun, Fuentes, Humphreys, & Sui, 2016), and
movements (Frings & Wentura, 2014).
Following from the aforementioned research, Humphreys
and Sui (2015) provide a framework that is primarily situated
within the attentional domain aimed at explaining self-
representational effects (the Self Attention Network). The
framework is based on the notion that the individual’s self-
representation is continuously activated and is thus rapidly trig-
gered by the presence of a self-representational stimulus. This
Bchronically activated self^ interacts with bottom-up orienting
processes to generate a self-advantage in attention. Thus, the
self-face advantage, for example, could be explained by the
rapid engagement of bottom-up orienting processes stemming
from a chronically activated self-schema in relation to the par-
ticipant observing their own face. Top-down attentional control
mechanisms may also interact with bottom-up orienting in a
facilitatory or inhibitory capacity. Importantly though, self-
prioritization effects cannot be abolished through low prior ex-
pectancies for such stimuli (Sui et al., 2014). In other words, the
theory surrounding the SAN states that self-related attentional
processing is in some way special, which in turn predicts that
self-related stimuli should show advantages in the amount of
information that is incidentally encoded regarding co-occurring
features of the stimuli.
What are the consequences of such a bias to self-related
stimuli? If it is true that a self-representational stimulus re-
ceives attentional priority, then the self-representational stim-
ulus may not simply be noticed more quickly, but the stimulus
may also receive enhanced perceptual processing. Bottom-up
attention has been shown to improve judgments of contrast
(Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004; Lui, Abrams, & Carrasco,
2009), spatial frequency (Gobell & Carrasco, 2005), and even
facial attractiveness (Störmer & Alvarez, 2016). The amount
of information we store in memory about attended features is
also affected by what we attend to (Bays & Husain, 2008). If
self-representational stimuli induce a bias in visual attention,
then the amount of information that one encodes and stores
about their appearance may be greater than that for non-self-
relevant objects that are presented concurrently. Indeed, the
idea of an attentional mechanism propagating to enhanced
encoding for self-representational stimuli has been suggested
much earlier (Turk, van Bussel, Brebner et al., 2011; Turk, van
Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011; Turk et al., 2013). It is pos-
sible, however, that the observed bias to self-representational
stimuli is restricted simply to recognition, with no additional
differences in how objects are perceptually processed. That is,
self-representational stimuli may simply have faster access to
semantic memory structures that allow for the recognition of
the fact that a self-representational stimulus is in view without
a more detailed representation of the stimulus’ features in
memory. We will refer to these two possibilities as the visual
attention bias account and the self-recognition account,
respectively.
In this paper, we contrasted the visual attention bias and
self-recognition accounts of self-relevance effects by asking
participants to remember and report the specific colors of self-
and non-self-relevant objects while performing a categoriza-
tion task. Psychophysical studies of memory have successful-
ly modeled memory for the features of visual objects as a
combination of whether a feature is remembered at all and
how precisely a feature is remembered (see Zhang & Luck,
2008; Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Ma, Husain, & Bays,
2014). Importantly, attention to particular items has been
shown to affect the probability that an item is stored in mem-
ory (Murray, Nobre, Clark, Cravo, & Stokes, 2013; Souza,
Rerko, Lin, & Oberauer, 2014) and sometimes its precision
(Gunseli, van Moorselaar, Meeter, & Olivers, 2015; Rajsic,
Ouslis, Wilson, & Pratt, 2017). Given the close connection
between attention and memory, we predicted that self-
representational stimuli, which show speeded processing
(Sui et al., 2012), would also be remembered with either great-
er probability or precision.
For each experiment, participants were required to associ-
ate three shapes with three identities: themselves, their mother,
and a stranger. The first experiment presented all three shapes
simultaneously and required participants to remember the
colors and locations of each. Experiments 2 and 3 involved
a less cognitively demanding task in which only one of the
shapes was presented per trial. The experimental tasks re-
quired participants to make two sequential judgments regard-
ing (1) whether a shape and label pair matched or not (Shape
Classification, based on Sui et al., 2012), and (2) the color of
the target stimulus (Color Estimation, based on Zhang &
Luck, 2008). The first judgment was initially memory-based.
That is, the shape was indicated after the shape/s had disap-
peared (Experiments 1 and 2) except in Experiment 3 where
the classification was perceptual in nature in that shape and
label simultaneously appeared and remained on screen until a
response was made. The color estimation judgment in each of
the three experiments was always memory based and the tar-
get of the judgment was indicated by an uncolored shape.
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In line with previous experiments demonstrating self-
prioritization with the shape/label matching task, it was gen-
erally expected that response times for shape classification
would be faster for self-trials than for mother and stranger
trials. Indeed, previous studies have demonstrated just this
pattern of response times (Sui et al., 2014). If these faster
self-judgments reflect rapid perceptual processing, then they
ought to occur only when the self-related shape is visible
when being judged. However, if rapid self-processing in this
task comes from differential post-perceptual processing, then
this self-advantage should occur when the judgment is made
on remembered shapes as well.
For color estimation, if self-representational stimuli are more
likely to attract and sustain visual attention (SAN, Humphreys &
Sui, 2015), then participants’ memory for the color of the self-
stimulus should be biased such that they can more often, or more
precisely, recall the color of the self-related object (Zhang &
Luck, 2008). As such, we predicted that, in all the present exper-
iments, memory for the color of self-representational stimuli
would be superior to that of mother and stranger shapes consis-
tent with the visual attention account.
Experiment 1
On each trial we presented participants with three randomly
colored shapes: the self shape, the mother shape, and the
stranger shape, and participants were required to remember
the location and color of each shape. According to the SAN,
the presence of a self-representational stimulus should trigger
bottom-up orienting processes. If this is the case, attention
would not be evenly distributed over the exposure period
and any self-prioritization with regard to attention would en-
sure that the self-stimulus is encoded in working memory and
may receive a benefit from enhanced elaborative encoding
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). In this sense, it is expected that
when memory is probed regarding the identity of a target
stimulus, participants would have shorter response times to
respond on Self Trials than on Mother and Stranger Trials.
Similarly, when memory for the color of the self-stimulus is
tested, it should be reported more precisely and/or exhibit a
greater likelihood that its color is present in working memory
at the time of the probe (p(Mem), Zhang & Luck, 2008).
Method
Participants
A minimum number of participants was set at 20 and all par-
ticipants who signed up completed the experiment. In total 36
first-year Psychology students participated in this experiment.
All participants provided informed consent before participat-
ing and were compensated with course credit. The methods
employed were approved by the Office of Research Ethics at
the University of Toronto.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were generated and presented using MATLAB by
Mathworks (Natick, MA, USA) and the Psychophysics tool-
box (Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007) on 17-in. CRTmonitors
on a black background. Participants viewed stimuli from a
fixed distance (57 cm) using chin rests. Three shape stimuli
were randomly sampled for each participant from a set of six
shapes (an equilateral triangle, a circle, a hexagon tilted 45°
from vertical, a rhombus, a five-sided star, and a heart). All
shapes were drawn such that their outer edges were bounded
by a 4° square. Fixation was encouraged using a 0.5° B+^
symbol in the center of the screen. During induction, shape
stimuli were drawn in white (RGB: [255, 255, 255]) and dur-
ing the experiment, colors were sampled from a color wheel in
L*A*B space, centered on [20, 35] with a radius of 50. On a
given trial, the colors of the shapes were sampled from a set of
eight colors, chosen to ensure 45° of separation but with a
random rotation applied so that all colors were equally likely
to appear. RGB values were calculated using MATLAB’s
makecform and applycform functions. All responses were col-
lected from a standard USB computer mouse with two input
buttons (left and right).
Procedure
Induction After being greeted and instructed by the experi-
menter, participants were asked to input their name, their
mother’s name, and a stranger’s name into the computer. If
the participant asked about the stranger’s name they were
given the further instruction of inserting Ba random name that
does not belong to someone you know.^ Proper nouns were
used to avoid possible stimulus asymmetries (see Schäfer,
Wentura, & Frings, 2017; Wade & Vickery, 2017). The com-
puter script subsequently assigned these names to be random-
ly paired with three shapes. Participants were then shown the
three shapes on the screen simultaneously, and their corre-
sponding labels were presented below the shape.
Training When ready, participants initiated a test session
where they were shown one of the three shapes (randomly
sampled) with either its correct label or an incorrect label
below it (also randomly sampled; 4.8° below the center of
the shape, size 18 Arial font). Participants pressed the left
mouse button if they believed that the label was correct for
that shape, and the right mouse button if they believed it was
incorrect. If an error was made, participants were returned to
the instruction screen. Participants were required to get nine of
these responses correct in a row before they could move be-
yond the training phase.
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Experiment The experimental task combined a shape classifi-
cation task (Judgment 1, Sui et al., 2012) with a delayed color
estimation task (Judgment 2, Zhang & Luck, 2008).
Participants completed 324 trials, divided across six blocks.
Each trial began with a 1,000-ms fixation display comprised
of a single white B+^ centered on a black background.
Following the fixation display, all three shapes (each with a
different random color, as detailed above) were presented on
screen for 500 ms. The shapes were presented centered on the
perimeter of on an imaginary circle around fixation, radius 8°,
at 45° (below and right of fixation), 180° (above fixation), and
315° (below and left of fixation). The specific location of each
object on a given trial was randomized. Following a 1,000-ms
blank screen, a label was presented in the center of the screen
alongside an arrow, 1.25° in length, that pointed towards one
of the three locations where the stimuli had been. Participants
then responded with the left mouse button if this label
matched the shape that had appeared in that location, and with
the right mouse button if the label did not match. If the incor-
rect response was made, feedback was immediately presented
in the center of the screen in the following manner: BIncorrect.
The shape was <correct label>^, in red font, for 1,000 ms.
Following a correct response to Judgment 1 or an error
screen, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms. An object
(the shape of one of the objects presented at the start of the
trial) appeared in white at the center of the screen. Around this
object, a color wheel with a radius of 8.12° and a width of
0.32° that depicted all possible stimulus colors was presented.
Participants used the computer mouse to select the color they
believed best matched the shape as it had been presented at the
beginning of the trial. Once participants moved the mouse 6°
or more from the center of the screen, the shape was redrawn
in the color corresponding to the angle that subtended between
the mouse cursor and the center of the screen. Participants
clicked the left mouse button to complete their color choice.
After this response, a 1,000-ms delay separated the end of the
trial and the start of the next trial (Fig. 1).
Data analysis
Participants were retained for analysis if they performed the
shape-label judgment with 85% accuracy or greater over the
entire experiment (four removed). One participant’s data was
also removed because they inserted BBeyonce^ as the
stranger’s name. Henceforth, the final sample was n = 31.
For the shape classification task, mean response times in each
condition included only trials with a correct response. For the
color estimation task, three measures were calculated, again
only including trials where participants classified the shape
correctly. One measure was the mean absolute deviation: the
average unsigned difference between the reported color and
actual shape’s color in a given condition. The other two mea-
sures were estimates of the precision of memory (Memory
Standard Deviation) and the probability of memory
(p(Mem)). Briefly, these two latent memory measures were
estimated from report errors by finding the maximum likeli-
hood parameters of a mixture model, which assumes memory
error results from several sources: imprecision of color repre-
sentation (SD) and randomly-distributed responses (1 –
p(Mem), resulting from either pure guesses or swap errors).
These parameters were estimated separately for each partici-
pant and condition using the three-component model (Bays
et al., 2009). Note that we focussed our analyses on the prob-
ability that an item’s color is remembered and did not focus on
the relative contributions of Bswap^ and guess errors to mem-
ory, as color swapping occurred as often for self-stimuli as for
non-self-stimuli.
Results and discussion
Statistical analyses were conducted using JASP using default
priors (JASP Team, 2018).We report Bayes factors expressing
the probability of the data given the alternative hypothesis
relative to the null hypothesis (i.e., values larger than 1 are
in favor of the alternative) unless stated otherwise. Recall that
the aim of the present experiment was to determine if self-
prioritization propagates higher fidelity representations in
memory for the self-representational stimulus, as compared
to other-representational stimuli. To this end we analyzed re-
sponse times to the self-classification judgment to determine if
self-prioritization occurred. From the color estimation task,
we derived three dependent measures that index the probabil-
ity that the stimulus was in memory and the precision of that
representation in memory. We analyzed the data in relation to
two factors –Cue Identity and Target Identity – to determine if
there were any memory benefits for the self-stimulus as well
as if there were any memory benefits to the cued stimulus. The
presence of a self-prioritization effect in response times and
memory-dependent variables would be consistent with the
visual attention hypothesis that self-stimuli enjoy greater at-
tentional prioritization, which then propagates to an enhanced
representation in memory.
Shape classification judgment
Participants were generally accurate in response to the Shape
Classification probe (M = 93.59%, SD = 3.49%), and as such
we restrict our analyses to response time. We tested models
specifying the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and
Trial Type (Match/Mismatch). The analysis revealed that the
data were 1.23 times more likely under a model with the main
effect of Trial Type (BF10=1.21, see Fig. 2, Panel A); all other
models performed worse than the null. In fact, looking at the
critical factor of interest (Identity) for match trials only where
self-prioritization typically manifests (Sui et al., 2012), the
data were 3.59 times more likely under the null model
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(BF10=.28). Collectively, the results of these analyses speak
against a model containing the factor of Identity and suggest
that the critical factor of interest is not playing a role in the
present pattern of data. That is, contrary to previous self-
prioritization results (e.g., Sui et al., 2012) and our hypotheses,
the data indicate that participants identified each shape with
similar speed.
Color estimation judgment
We tested color judgments on models specifying the factors of
Cue Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Target Identity
(Self/Mother/Stranger). Note that Bcue^ here refers to which
shape’s label was queried in the middle the trial, and Btarget^
refers to which shape’s color was tested at the end of the trial
Mean absolute deviation For models specifying the factors
above, data were shown to be 3.127e +26 times more likely
under the full model with two main effects and an interaction
as compared to the null (BF10=3.127e +26). Analysis of the
effects for matched models revealed that the strength of this
model was primarily attributable to the interaction
(BFInteraction = 1.398e+29) with the evidence against the inclu-
sion of Cue Identity (BFCue Identity = 0.048) and Target Identity
(BFTarget Identity = 0.046). We followed up this interaction by
comparing Cue for all Target Identities. This follow-up anal-
ysis revealed participants were more accurate when
responding to cued targets (see Table 1 and Fig. 2, Panel B)
relative to uncued targets.
Memory standard deviation The data were shown to be 10.99
times more likely under the null hypothesis relative to the next
best performing model (a main effect of Cue Identity,
BF10=0.09, see Fig. 2, Panel C).
P(Mem) For models specifying the factors above, the data
were shown to be 2.408e +21 times more likely under a
model containing an interaction term relative to the null
model. As with Mean Absolute Deviation, analysis of the
effects for matched models revealed that the strength of
this model was primarily attributable to the interaction
(BFInteraction = 9.444e+23) with the evidence against the
inclusion of Cue Identity (BFCue Identity = 0.050) and
Target Identity (BFTarget Identity = 0.052). Similar to
Mean Absolute Deviation, post hoc tests revealed that
the source of this interaction was attributable to a greater
likelihood that the cued stimuli were in memory at the
time of the probe as compared to uncued stimuli (see
Table 2 and Fig. 2, Panel D).
Overall, Experiment 1 did not provide any support for the
previously demonstrated self-prioritization in identification
processes, the hypothesized effects of self-prioritization on
the probability that the stimulus was in memory, or the preci-
sion of the memory. Nevertheless, cued stimuli (relative to
uncued stimuli) were evidently more likely to be in memory
at the time of the probe and were more likely to be remem-
bered more accurately. Confirmation of the cueing effect pro-
vides evidence that the measures are sensitive to the processes
that we intended to probe within the present series of
experiments.
Fig. 1 Schematic (not to scale) of the trial structure used for Experiments 1–3. Delay (500ms) between label response and memory probe is not pictured
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Experiment 2
Although there was no evidence for self-prioritization inworking
memory in Experiment 1, it is possible that the high cognitive
load of remembering three object locations and their color inter-
feres with processes supporting self-prioritization in cognition,
which would prevent any information processing benefits from
influencingworkingmemory processes. Indeed, previously it has
been shown that divided attention abolishes the self-referential
effect in memory (Turk et al., 2013). In Experiment 2, we
adapted the task to reduce the cognitive load to examine if self-
referential benefits can be observed in working memory.
Method
Participants
As with Experiment 1, a minimum target of 20 participants
was set and all participants who signed up completed the
Fig. 2 Panel A: Response time for match and mismatch trials by Target
Identity for Experiment 1. Remaining panels:Mean Absolute Deviation
(B), Memory Standard Deviation (C) and P(Mem) (D) for Self, Mother,
and Stranger shapes by Cue Identity (Self, Mother, and Stranger) for
Experiment 1. All error bars are standard error of the mean
Table 1 Cuing effects on mean absolute deviation. BF10 of Cued/
Uncued comparison in brackets. Cued comparison is the value against
which the targets (Uncued) were compared. Thus, Self under BCued
comparison^ refers to Cue-Self Target-Self, which would be compared
against Cue-Self Target-Mother and Cue-Self Target-Stranger. The cue-
ing effect is calculated as a benefit; as such, a positive value demonstrates
how much further the uncued target deviated from the cued target
Cued comparison Target Cueing effect BF10
Self Mother 25.50 4,168
Stranger 26.44 9,425
Mother Self 23.02 1,885
Stranger 26.59 103,684
Stranger Self 24.97 31,519
Mother 23.83 8,877
Table 2 Cuing effects on P(Mem). BF10 of Cued/Uncued comparison
in brackets. Cued comparison is the value against which the targets
(Uncued) were compared. Thus, Self under BCued comparison^ refers
to Cue-Self Target-Self which would be compared against Cue-Self
Target-Mother and Cue-Self Target-Stranger. The cueing effect is calcu-
lated as a benefit; as such, a positive value demonstrates how much more
likely the cued stimulus was in memory at the time of the probe relative to
the uncued stimulus
Cued comparison Target Cueing effect BF10
Self Mother .31 10,042
Stranger .31 29,698
Mother Self .28 4,462
Stranger .33 9,701
Stranger Self .28 2,051
Mother .30 7,165
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experiment. In total, 30 undergraduates enrolled in a first-year
psychology course at the University of Toronto participated in
this experiment. Variation in the availability of students ac-
counts for the different sample size. All participants were
compensated with course credit and provided informed con-
sent before participating. The methods employed were ap-
proved by the Office of Research Ethics at the University of
Toronto.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli and apparatus were identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
Experimental procedures were identical to Experiment 1 with
the following exception: during experimental trials only one
shape was presented. Following the delay, a label was present-
ed in the same position as the labels had been presented in
Experiment 1 – participants were required to respond with the
left mouse button if the label was correct and the right mouse
button if the label was incorrect. The label remained on screen
until a response was made.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed in the same way as Experiment 1. Two
participants were removed prior to analysis because they
failed to reach the 85% accuracy threshold. Henceforth, the
final sample in Experiment 2 was n = 28.
Results and discussion
The aim of the present experiments was to see if self-
prioritization creates a higher fidelity representation of self-
related objects relative to objects not related to the self. In the
first experiment we could not determine whether self-
prioritization propagates a higher fidelity representation be-
cause we were not able to detect self-prioritization.
Nevertheless, we were able to confirm that the dependent
measures derived from the color estimation task were sensi-
tive to differences in attentional prioritization by way of cuing.
Thus, in Experiment 2, we analyzed the response times of the
shape classification judgment to confirm the presence of self-
prioritization followed by analyzing the three variables from
the color estimation task that probe the probability that the
color of the stimulus was in memory and the precision of that
representation.
Shape classification judgment
Participants were generally accurate in response to the Shape
Classification probe (M = 97.51%, SD = 2.75%); as such, we
restrict our analyses to response time. We tested models spec-
ifying the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial
Type (Match/Mismatch). The analysis revealed that the data
were 18,738 times more likely under a model with two main
effects and an interaction. Because Match and Mismatch trials
generally produce different patterns of results (Sui et al.,
2012), we followed up this omnibus analysis by comparing
the levels of Identity separately for each type of trial.
Match trials Given the a priori prediction that self-
prioritization would be evident in the data, we tested the pre-
diction that the Self Trials would have shorter response times
than the Mother and Stranger Trials. The data were more like-
ly under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis for
both of these predictions, BF10 = 31.20 and BF10 = 73.20,
respectively. This result provides very strong evidence for
self-prioritization in relation to the Mother stimuli (Self: 798
ms, Mother: 946 ms) and Stranger stimuli (952 ms, see Fig. 3,
Panel A). When testing for any difference between Mother
and Stranger Stimuli, the data were 4.92 times more likely
under the null hypothesis, BF10=0.23, which equates to mod-
erate support for no difference between these two stimuli.
Overall, these results reveal a clear self-prioritization effect
in working memory in match trials that replicates previous
work demonstrating the effect when the object and label are
simultaneously present (e.g., Sui et al., 2012).
Mismatch trials As with the analysis for Experiment 1, we
systematically tested for differences between the levels of
Identity. The data were 9.46 times more likely under the alter-
native hypothesis that self-trials would be faster than mother
trials (Self: 931 ms, Mother: 982 ms). The data were only
anecdotally more likely under the null for the Self versus
Stranger comparison (Stranger: 970 ms, BF10=0.90). When
testing the hypothesis that there would be no difference be-
tween Mother and Stranger Trials, moderate evidence was
obtained (BF10=4.53).
Color estimation judgment
Mean absolute deviation As with response time, we tested
models specifying the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/
Stranger) and Trial Type (Match/Mismatch). The data were
shown to be 4.90 times more likely under the null hypothesis
(see Fig. 3, Panel B) relative to the next best performingmodel
(a main effect of Trial Type, BF10=0.20). This outcome rep-
resents moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
Memory standard deviation Again, we tested models specify-
ing the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial
Type (Match/Mismatch). The data were shown to be 3.48
times more likely under the null hypothesis (see Fig. 3,
Panel C) relative to the next best performing model (a main
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effect of Trial Type, BF10=0.29). Again, this outcome repre-
sents moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
P(Mem) Last, we tested models specifying the factors of
Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial Type (Match/
Mismatch) for the measure P(Mem). The data were shown
to be 2.56 times more likely under the null hypothesis (see
Fig. 3, Panel D) relative to the next best performing model (a
main effect of Trial Type, BF10=0.33).
Given the presence of self-prioritization in the response
times, the absence of effects of an object’s self-relatedness
on color memory is striking. We should note that the support
for the null model obtained still leaves room to doubt the null
hypothesis. Nevertheless, we contend that if self-
representational stimuli act to produce attentional prioritiza-
tion as originally hypothesized then we should observe higher
fidelity representations within memory much the same way as
location-based cues provided higher fidelity representations in
Experiment 1 for which the evidence was extreme. Thus far
we have found no support for our hypothesis that the fidelity
of the self-stimulus in memory is enhanced relative to other
relevant stimuli, and our data are most consistent with the self-
recognition hypothesis whereby self-prioritization is restricted
to recognizing that a self-representational stimulus is present
without any subsequent benefits to encoding in working
memory.
Experiment 3
Although Experiment 2 showed that self-prioritization was
evident in response times during retrieval of the target stimu-
lus (Shape Classification), there was little evidence that self-
prioritization processes had any impact on the fidelity of the
representation in memory or the probability that the stimulus
was in memory (Color Estimation). It is possible, however,
that performing the initial identity judgment while the object is
encoded may enhance encoding and thus the fidelity of the
representation in memory. To examine this possibility, we had
participants perform a shape classification task while the ob-
ject was still on screen.
Method
Participants
As with the previous experiments, a target of 20 participants
was set and all participants who signed up completed the
experiment. In total, 21 undergraduate students who were en-
rolled in a first-year psychology course at the University of
Toronto participated in this experiment. Variation in the avail-
ability of students accounts for the different sample size. All
were compensated with course credit and provided informed
consent before participating. The methods employed were
Fig. 3 Panel A: Response time for match and mismatch trials by Target
Identity for Experiment 2. Remaining panels:Mean Absolute Deviation
(B), Memory Standard Deviation (C) and P(Mem) (D) for Self, Mother,
and Stranger shapes by Cue Identity (Self, Mother, and Stranger) for
Experiment 2. All error bars are standard error of the mean
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approved by the Office of Research Ethics at the University of
Toronto.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli and apparatus were the same as previous experiments.
Procedure
The experimental task was the same as that used in
Experiment 2 except that the label appeared 2.4° below the
shape’s center at the same time as the shape. The shape
remained on screen until this response. After this, the experi-
ment trial proceeded exactly the same way as Experiment 2.
Data analysis
Data analysis was conducted in the same way as previous ex-
periments. Because one participant’s data did not meet the ac-
curacy threshold of 85% their data were removed; thus, n = 20.
Results and discussion
In Experiment 2, we detected a self-prioritization effect in
shape identity verification times, but we still did not detect
the hypothesized benefits to memory fidelity. Nevertheless,
the conclusion that self-prioritization does not result in the
theoretically-predicted enhanced memory representation may
still be premature. In Experiment 3, participants completed the
color estimation task directly after observing the shape and
color. As with Experiment 2, we first analyzed the response
times from the shape classification judgment to determine if
self-prioritization was present. We then analyzed the three
dependent measures derived from the color estimation task
to determine if there were any benefits for the self-stimulus
in the probability and precision measures for memory. If we
are still unable to detect a benefit in the color estimation mea-
sures, then our results will be most consistent with the self-
recognition hypothesis that self-stimuli have faster access to
semantic structures within memory (rapid identification) with-
out further benefits to fidelity of the representation within
memory.
Shape classification judgment
Participants were generally accurate in response to the Shape
Classification probe (M = 97.35, SD = 2.07); as such we re-
strict our analyses to response time. We tested models speci-
fying the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial
Type (Match/Mismatch). The analysis revealed that the data
were 7.72 times more likely under a model with two main
effects (Identity and Trial Type) and an interaction as com-
pared to the null model, which was also the next best
performing model. Because Match and Mismatch trials typi-
cally produce different patterns of results with regards to
Identity (Sui et al., 2012), we followed up this omnibus anal-
ysis by comparing the levels of Identity separately for each
type of trial.
Match trials Given the a priori prediction that self-
prioritization would be evident in the data, we tested the pre-
diction that the Self trials would have shorter response times
than the Stranger and Mother Trials. The data were more like-
ly under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis for
both of these predictions, BF10 = 21.63 and BF10 = 3.02. This
result provides strong evidence for self-prioritization in rela-
tion to the Stranger stimulus (Self: 1,250 ms, Stranger: 1,472
ms, see Fig. 4, Panel A) and moderate evidence in relation to
the mother stimulus (1,419 ms). When testing for a difference
betweenMother and Stranger Stimuli the data were 3.29 times
more likely under the null hypothesis, BF10=0.31, which
equates to moderate support for no difference between these
two stimuli. Overall, the results are consistent with our hy-
pothesis that self-prioritization would be observed in response
times for match trials.
Mismatch trials To follow up on mismatch trials, we system-
atically tested for differences between the levels of Identity.
The data were moderately more likely under the null for both
Self versus Mother (Self: 1,479 ms, Mother: 1,437 ms,
BF10=0.32) and Mother versus Stranger (Stranger: 1,404 ms,
BF10=0.30) comparisons. Only anecdotal evidence in favor of
the null hypothesis was obtained for the Self versus Stranger
comparison (BF10=0.90). Overall, these results suggest that
there were no robust differences between Stimuli for
Mismatch trials and are consistent with the previous work that
employs the self-association matching task.
Color estimation judgment
Mean absolute deviation As with response time, we tested
models specifying the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/
Stranger) and Trial Type (Match/Mismatch). The data were
shown to be 1.002 times more likely under the null model
(see Fig. 4, Panel B) relative to the next best performingmodel
(a main effect of Trial Type, BF10=0.998). Because the models
perform equally well, comparing the null against the next best
performing model concerning our factor of interest is warrant-
ed. In this case the data were 10.00 times more likely under the
null model than a model comprised of the main effects of
Identity and Trial Type (BF10= .10).
Memory standard deviation Again, we tested models specify-
ing the factors of Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial
Type (Match/Mismatch). The data were shown to be 3.39
times more likely under the null hypothesis (see Fig. 4,
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Panel C) relative to the next best performing model (a main
effect of Trial Type, BF10=.30). Again, this result represents
moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
P(Mem) Last, we tested models specifying the factors of
Identity (Self/Mother/Stranger) and Trial Type (Match/
Mismatch) for the measure P(Mem). The data were shown
to be 3.65 times more likely under the null hypothesis (see
Fig. 4, Panel D) relative to the next best performing model (a
main effect of Trial Type, BF10=0.27). Again, this result rep-
resents moderate evidence in favour of the null hypothesis.
Replicating Experiment 2, evidence of self-prioritization
was obtained but there was no evidence that this initial re-
sponse time effect propagated enhanced representations in
memory even when the color probe occurred directly after
observing the color (as indicated by the null effect in all three
color estimation measures). This result is most consistent with
the self-recognition hypothesis that self-prioritization is re-
stricted to processes that support the rapid identification of
self-stimuli over other stimuli.
General discussion
The present series of experiments aimed to establish whether
self-predilections (1) extend from rapid stimulus processing
while the stimulus is visible to speeded judgments about the
same stimulus stored in short-termmemory, and (2) propagate
enhanced encoding for the features of a stimulus thus creating
a higher fidelity representation of the stimulus within short-
term memory. We contrasted two hypotheses: the visual atten-
tion bias hypothesis, which is founded upon the idea that self-
stimuli receive greater attentional allocation and, as such,
should be encoded with greater fidelity; and the self-
recognition hypothesis, which suggests that self-
prioritization is restricted to identification-based processes
and, as such, has faster access to semantic structures without
further benefits regarding the fidelity of the representation.
After confirming that color memory differences due to atten-
tion were measurable in Experiment 1, Experiments 2 and 3
tested the two hypotheses under reduced cognitive load. The
response time data are most consistent with self-prioritization,
replicating previous work (e.g., Sui et al., 2012). These self-
prioritization effects occur regardless of whether the judgment
is done in the context of working memory (Experiment 2) or
done while all stimuli are perceptually available (Experiment
3). Despite the emergence of a self-prioritization effect, in
both cases there was no effect of stimulus identity on the
fidelity of the representation in memory. We contend that if
self-representational stimuli act to produce attentional effects
then we should have observed higher fidelity representations
within memory much the same way as location-based cues
provided higher fidelity representations in Experiment 1 for
which there was robust evidence.
Fig. 4 Panel A: Response time for match and mismatch trials by Target
Identity for Experiment 3. Remaining panels:Mean Absolute Deviation
(B), Memory Standard Deviation (C) and P(Mem) (D) for Self, Mother,
and Stranger shapes by Cue Identity (Self, Mother, and Stranger) for
Experiment 3. All error bars are standard error of the mean
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Thus, our results are most consistent with the self-
recognition hypothesis because self-prioritization was only
observed with regard to shape classification and not color
estimation.
We should note that the moderate support obtained in
Experiments 2 and 3 for the null model (no effect of any of
our factors) relative to a model containing a main effect of
Trial Type regarding the color estimation tasks leaves substan-
tial room for doubt. Indeed, for some measures, the probablity
of the data occuring under a null model or a model containing
a main effect of Trial Type was almost identical. Nevertheless,
we were primarily concerned with stimulus identity. It is very
clear that a model containing identity was not a good candi-
date to explain the presented color estimation data.
There are a few things worth noting about Experiment 1.
First, this experiment required that participants retain the lo-
cation and color of three identity stimuli in working memory.
No self-prioritization was observed in either the shape classi-
fication judgment or the color estimation task. The lack of
effect under high cognitive load is consistent with previous
work suggesting that self-based effects are not automatic and
require sufficient cognitive resources (Turk et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, for the color estimation task participants were
more accurate if the shape was cued in the shape classification
probe than when it was not cued. This cuing modulation of
responses to color estimation confirms that such measures are
sensitive to whether or not an object is attended, which was
critical for our theoretical rationale.
The disruption of self-prioritization during retrieval (Shape
Classification) in Experiment 1 is interesting in the context of
the present theory concerning the SAN (Humphreys & Sui,
2015). If one assumes that bottom-up orienting processes in-
teract with a chronically activated self-schema to preferential-
ly tune information processing to self-stimuli, then the self
should act in a manner akin to a cueing benefit. That is, if
bottom-up orienting processes were engaged in the present
experiment, then the self-representational stimuli would have
been preferentially attended to regardless of the number of
other stimuli present, and thus encoded and retrieved more
efficiently. Similarly, there was no fidelity boost to self-
stimuli in any experiment, which would be expected if the
self-stimulus was allocated greater attentional processing
(Zhang& Luck, 2008). Rather, it seems that when participants
must remember the color and location of all stimuli present,
attention is not allocated preferentially on the basis of stimulus
identity. This outcome clearly contradicts a bottom-up
orienting account. These results join a growing body of liter-
ature that questions the automaticity of possible perceptual
and attentional self-referential enhancements (Alexopoulos,
Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; Constable et al., 2019;
Golubickis, Falben, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2018). Indeed,
the initial allocation of attention (Bundesen, Kyllingsbaek,
Houmann, & Jensen, 1997; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar,
2003; Harris, Pashler, & Coburn, 2004; Keyes &
Dlugokencka, 2014) and sufficient attentional resources
(Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Turk et al., 2013) must be present
to elicit a number of self-referential effects.
Even when cognitive load was reduced in Experiments 2
and 3, results still favored the self-recognition hypothesis. The
results of Experiment 2 demonstrated rapid self processing
even when the stimulus in question was represented in work-
ing memory. The results of Experiment 3 replicated the rapid
identification of the self-stimulus while it was still visible.
Neither of these experiments confirmed our initial hypothesis
that self-prioritization should lead to a higher fidelity repre-
sentation of the self-stimulus within short-term memory.
Therefore, the results are most consistent with the self-
recognition account whereby self-prioritization terminates
with the recognition of a self-based stimulus without further
processing benefits. It is possible, however, that such a
memory-enhancement could be found if color encoding were
somehow made more challenging than in Experiments 2 and
3, but not as challenging as in Experiment 1. However, if such
a nuanced balance was required, that would call into question
the ecological validity of such an effect.
Overall, the present results suggest that self-prioritization is
restricted to features that define selfhood (in this case shape)
and not incidental features that co-occur with self-
representational features. The extent to which the self-
recognition theorymight be generalizable to naturally occurring
stimuli would be an interesting avenue for future research, and
may further inform the way that self is represented within mem-
ory. For example, humans may have better memory for self-
representational features that do not typically or frequently
change, like eye color or the shape of a face, as well as features
that might be meaningful (e.g., location), but no preferential
memory for things that frequently change, like clothing, that
are perhaps less meaningful. Indeed, short-term memory
encoding can be restricted to specific object features deemed
necessary (Woodman & Vogel, 2008; Chen, Swan, & Wybel,
2016). However, in the task used in the present experiments,
both features were task-relevant, and so both were certainly
encoded. Overall, it may be simpler to suppose that perceptual
processing is not better for self-stimuli, but that it is the associ-
ation between particular visual features (i.e., shapes) and self-
concepts (i.e., names) in long-term memory that is stronger,
allowing for quicker decisions. This notion is consistent with
theory stemming from the self-reference effect in memory,
which states that the self is not special in and of itself other than
it provides scaffolding to strengthen semantic memory struc-
tures (Symons & Johnson, 1997).
In conclusion, our results suggest that the present self-
prioritization effects are more consistent with an improvement
in the ability to recognize that a self-representational stimulus
is present, without a tendency to devote more perceptual and
short-term memory resources to such objects. Given that our
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results showed that such benefits occurred only for cued stim-
uli, we suggest that it is more likely that differences in the
fidelity of stimulus representations come from general expec-
tations of importance. It is possible that contextual factors that
co-occur with self-representational or self-relevant stimuli
could modulate such expectations of importance in a manner
akin to cued stimuli and thus result in similar enhancements to
the detail of the representation in memory. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that self-representational stimuli are perceived and
remembered with more perceptual detail merely by virtue of
their being self-representational.
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